Application of the Illinois Summary Suspension Law and Constitutional Implications
*This is an abbreviated version of a copyrighted article by The Davis Law Group, P.C. which first appeared in the Illinois Bar Journal, a publication of the Illinois State Bar Association, in May, 1988, Vol. 76, No. 9.
On January 1, 1986, Illinois joined 23 other states by adopting the concept of summary suspension of the driving privileges of persons arrested for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs (DUI). Illinois was following a course set by Minnesota which was the first state to embrace the concept in 1976.
The impetus to enact such a law in Illinois grew out of a proposal of the Illinois DUI Task Force on Drunk Driving, chaired by Secretary of State Jim Edgar. Legislation was introduced in the Illinois House in April, 1985. As originally proposed, summary suspension hearings were to be conducted as administrative hearings by the Office of the Secretary of State. Relief from an order of suspension, in the form of a hardship license, was only to be granted by the secretary of state.
Prior to January 1, 1986, the Illinois Implied Consent Law provided that, upon an arrest for a violation of the Illinois DUI Law, a driver who refused a lawful request to submit to a chemical test was subject to a mandatory six month or 12 month license suspension, depending upon whether the driver was a first or multiple offender. The person could request a hearing within 28 days of the date of written notice of refusal. Failure to request such a hearing was jurisdictional and the court could not entertain a request filed after the expiration of that time.
Under the previous law, if the person requested a hearing within the statutory 28 day period, the suspension was indefinitely delayed and, in many cases, could be avoided completely through plea-bargaining.
The complaint of the sponsors of the summary suspension law was that the previous system did not provide for a swift and certain loss of license. It was their contention, supported by studies such as those conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board, that it is the swiftness and certainty of punishment, especially the loss of license, that is the most effective deterrent to the problem of the drinking driver.
After intensive negotiations between the Office of the Secretary of State and representatives of the Chicago Bar Association, including this author, an amended bill was agreed upon which subsequently passed both houses and was signed into law by the governor on September 12, 1985.
Adopting the arguments of the advocates of summary suspension, the legislature enunciated the policy behind the new law:
(A) Declaration of Policy
It is hereby declared a policy of the State of Illinois that the driver who is impaired by alcohol or other drugs is a threat to the public safety and welfare. Therefore, to provide a deterrent to such practice and to remove problem drivers from the highway, a statutory summary suspension is appropriate.
The concept of summary suspension has been subjected to constitutional review and, thus far, has passed constitutional muster.
In Bell v. Burson the United States Supreme Court held that a driver’s license constituted a constitutionally protected property interest and, therefore, state action in suspending a driver’s license must comply with due process requirements.
In Dixon v. Love, the United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue pre-hearing license deprivation when it upheld the right of the Illinois Secretary of State to suspend an Illinois driver’s license without the need to first hold a pre-suspension hearing based upon the driver’s conviction for numerous moving violations. In resolving this question, the court identified the factors to be considered and weighed in determining whether such a process was constitutionally permissible. These factors were: the private interest to be affected by the state’s action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest; the value of any additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the fiscal or administrative burdens that such additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
However, the Supreme Court did not directly confront the constitutionality of summary suspension until it reviewed a Massachusetts law in the case of Mackey v. Montrym. In upholding the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute, the Court held that, in light of the fact that the law provided for an immediate post-suspension hearing and that the length of the suspension was for a period of only 90 days, the effect on the individual’s private interest, i.e., his or her driver’s license and privileges, was not substantial.
In applying the other elements of the test enunciated in Dixon the Court held that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a person’s driving privileges was not substantial enough to require a full evidentiary hearing prior to suspension. The Court specifically found that, in light of the presumption that the officer is a trained experienced and competent observer who reports personal observations under criminal and civil penalties for perjury the likelihood of a deliberate misrepresentation did not exist.
Finally, the Court recognized the state’s substantial interest in the public safety and that requiring the state to provide a predeprivation hearing would give motorists incentive not only to refuse breath testing, but also to request administrative hearings which would impose a substantial and therefore unreasonable fiscal and administrative burden upon the state.
While the Mackey case considered only the constitutionality of a statutory scheme providing for the pre-hearing deprivation of the driving privileges of individuals who refused chemical testing, other courts have considered and upheld the constitutionality of summary suspension laws providing for the suspension of the driving privileges of individuals who not only refuse testing, but also submit to testing and fail.
The question of whether these statutes are constitutional would appear to depend primarily upon three factors: the length of the proposed suspension of privileges; the availability of a prompt post-deprivation evidentiary hearing, and the availability of hardship relief during the suspension period.
Because of concerns with the constitutionality of Mr. Edgar’s original proposal, representatives of the bar successfully negotiated with the Office of the Secretary of State to correct these problems. The original proposal provided that summary suspension hearings were to be conducted by the Office of the Secretary of State and hardship relief from such suspension was to be available only from that office.
Concern over that office’s ability to conduct prompt administrative hearings resulted in an agreement to amend the proposed legislation to provide that all hearings, both petitions for rescission of suspensions as well as petitions for hardship relief from suspensions, were to be conducted by the circuit court.
To reach that point, it was necessary to reconsider the historical concept of the licensing of drivers in Illinois. In the past, suspension or revocation of driving privileges, as well as the granting of hardship relief to individuals whose licenses had been suspended or revoked, has been an exclusive function of the Office of the Secretary of State. The only route of appeal from an adverse decision of that office was under the Administrative Review Act.
Under the Illinois summary suspension laws, this is no longer the case. Summary suspension is now a judicial withdrawal of driving privileges by the circuit court and the consideration of hardship relief from such a suspension is, similarly, an exclusive function of the circuit court. Under this statutory scheme, the secretary of state acts primarily as a record keeper entering suspensions on drivers’ records, issuing hardship licenses as ordered by the courts and processing reinstatement fees and order.
The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Hamilton first addressed the constitutionality of the new Illinois summary suspension laws as a result of the state’s direct appeal of a ruling by a Williamson County Circuit Court judge. That judge primarily held that section 2-118.1 violated the doctrine of separation of powers.
The circuit court hehad also held that, by granting the court power to suspend driver’s licenses and privileges, the statute impermissibly allowed the court to invade a domain reserved to the Secretary of State and that the statute thus violated the separation of powers doctrine.
The Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State’s authority to regulate driver’s licenses in this state was a grant of power from the legislature, not the Constitution or the common law. Therefore, the legislature could similarly elect to diminish the power of the Secretary of State by granting the court such powers. The court further held that the statute did not impermissibly transfer any essential function of the Secretary of State to the courts nor did it create a burden upon the courts which would interfere with normal court functions.
The Illinois Supreme Court has also rejected challenges to the law based upon defendants’ claims that section 11-501.1 is violative of procedural due process and equal protection and that section 6-206.1, providing for the issuance of Judicial Driving Permits (JDPs) by the circuit court, violated the separation of powers doctrine by delegating an executive function of the Secretary of State to the judiciary.
The provisions of the new summary suspension laws are contained in sections 2-118.1; 6-206.1, 6-208.1 and 11-501.1. These sections address the right to a hearing and the issues to be addressed at the hearing; the right to seek a judicial driving permit and issues to be addressed at such hearing; the period of suspension as well as restoration of privileges after suspension; and general procedural provisions of the implied consent law from arrest of the individual to confirmation of the suspension by the Secretary of State.
Proceedings under the summary suspension laws are civil in nature and constitute an independent, separate and distinct proceeding from the DUI charge. The fact that a driver has been found not guilty of the DUI charge or the DUI charge has otherwise been dismissed, whether as a result of a motion filed by the defendant or as a result of the prosecution electing not to proceed, does not automatically serve as a basis to dismiss the implied consent proceedings against that driver. However, if an issue resulting in a dismissal or finding of not guilty of the DUI charge is also a relevant issue in the implied consent proceeding, it may be also raised in a challenge to the summary suspension.
Under summary suspension, any driver who is arrested for the offenses enumerated under section 11-501 and who, upon lawful request of the law enforcement officer, submits to a chemical test which reveals a blood alcohol concentration (B.A.C.) of .10 or more or, in the alternative, refuses to submit to such test is made subject to the sanctions provided therein. Therefore, the only drivers who are not subject to the penalties of the implied consent law are those individuals who submit to a test which results in a demonstrated B.A.C. of less than .10.
If the driver has either refused to submit to testing or has submitted to testing which showed a B.A.C. of .10 or more, the arresting officer is required to do two things. The officer must immediately submit a sworn report to the circuit court of venue and the Secretary of State which certifies that the officer lawfully requested that the driver submit to testing and that the driver either refused to submit to testing or that the testing showed a B.A.C. of more than .10. The officer must also serve immediate notice of the summary suspension on the driver.
A. Service of the notice of summary suspension
As stated above, the statute requires that notice of the statutory summary suspension be immediately served on the person by the arresting officer. The only exception to this requirement is where the evidence has been obtained by blood or urine testing. In those cases, due to the extended time necessary to obtain those test results, the arresting officer may give notice to the person by U. S. mail with postage prepaid, addressed to the person at his address as indicated on the citation.
The suspension becomes effective 46 days after the day that notice of suspension is served upon the driver. Normally, in cases where testing is done by means of a breath analysis, this will be 46 days from the date of arrest. In cases of blood or urine testing, this will normally be 46 days from the date notice is deposited in the mail.
Upon receipt of the officer’s sworn report, the Secretary of State must confirm the suspension by mailing a notice of the effective date of the suspension to the person and the circuit court. If the sworn report received by the Secretary of State is defective due to the fact that it does not contain sufficient information or is completed in error, the Secretary of State is required to return the sworn report to the circuit court with a copy to the issuing law enforcement agency identifying the defect. Under these circumstances, the Secretary of State is barred from entering the suspension on the person’s driving record.
Although the statute is silent as to whether a law enforcement agency may attempt to correct and re-serve a defective sworn report, re-service may in fact be unnecessary. In People v. Badoud, et al., the Illinois Supreme Court held that the failure of an officer to properly swear to a report could be simply cured by having the officer re-sworn to it in open court without requiring the rescission of the suspension or re-service of the sworn report.
While in Badoud there was no attempt to re-serve the notice by the law enforcement agency and no court has directly addressed this issue, it would appear that the use of the word “immediate” in the statute may not bar re-service of a notice of suspension or sworn report. This is in light of the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding as well as the court’s consistent interpretation of the statute so as to uphold the legislative objective of protecting the public safety and welfare of those using the highways.
Additionally, whether or not the court will extend its ruling and permit reports to be cured which are not merely unsworn but re substantively defective or incomplete is a matter of conjecture at this time.
B. Requirement of a sworn statememt
The issue of what constitutes a proper sworn report under the statute has generated a great deal of controversy, confusion and appellate consideration because a variety of forms have been issued by the Office of the Secretary of State for use by Illinois law enforcement agencies.
Under section 2-106, the Secretary of State is charged with the responsibility of prescribing the forms necessary to effectuate the provisions of the summary suspension laws. Consistent with this responsibility, that office prepared implied consent sworn report forms and distributed those forms to law enforcement agencies statewide prior to January 1, 1986, the effective date of the law. Appearing on these forms, directly above where the officer was to sign, was the statement: “I further solemnly, sincerely and duly declare and affirm that pursuant to Section 11-501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code I have:….”
In People v. Sullivan and Lovens, the first case to challenge this language as constituting an unsworn report in violation of the statute, the third district appellate court issued an opinion on February 19 1987, holding that the circuit court was correct in rescinding the summary suspension of the defendants because the reports were, indeed, unsworn and therefore defective. However, that opinion was withdrawn and it was redesigned a Rule 23 order on March 12, 1987, after the court noted that a new and redesigned form was now in use and that the decision therefore, had no precedential value.
Subsequently however, in two separate opinions, People v. Weigt and People v. Badoud, et al., the third appellate district held that the above-quoted language of the form was not in conformity with the statute because it was unsworn. The court found that the form did not require that the officer swear to the statements contained therein before an official authorized to administer oaths. More importantly, the court held in both cases that the state could not move to correct this defect by having the officer swear to the correctness of the report in open court where the suspensions of the defendants had already become effective.
While the third appellate district stressed the statutory reasons for not allowing a cure, the fourth appellate district court in People v. Farrell also finding the form of the report to be unsworn, stressed the constitutional reasons for not allowing the state to cure after the suspension had become effective.
Citing the Mackey case, the court held that the statutory requirement of a sworn report “takes on the importance of minimizing the danger of an erroneous deprivation of a driver’s license prior to the time a hearing is held”. Accordingly, the lack of a proper sworn report creates an unreasonable, and, therefore, unconstitutional risk of erroneous deprivation where the suspension of the driver has become effective and is based upon a defective report.
In the meantime however, the Illinois Supreme Court had agreed to review the decision of the appellate court in Badoud. In reversing the appellate court and ruling that the state could cure a defectively sworn report by having the officer resworn in open court, the supreme court held that:
…It seems apparent that, in providing that the officer shall “immediately” submit a sworn report to the Secretary of State, the General Assembly was simply emphasizing the new means by which the Secretary of State would receive the report, rather than altering (previous) judicial holdings that the deficiency in the report can be cured.
The court went on to hold that:
… an officer’s good-faith failure to initially swear to the report to be curable. This fosters the accomplishment of the legislation’s obvious objective of protecting individuals using the roads in this state.
The court also considered whether the curing of the sworn report must be accomplished prior to the entry of the suspension by the Secretary of State:
…we do not believe that the General Assembly intended to void a suspension entered upon a report which is unsworn…we believe that the legislative objective would be thwarted by holding void suspensions such as those occurring in the instant cases….
…Considering that the General Assembly obviously intended suspension hearings to be expedited (citation), and considering the fact that requiring prehearing amendments to the sworn report could delay the hearing date, we see no impropriety in swearing to the report at the hearing….
Rejecting the defendant’s constitutional objections, the court held that even if the defendant lost his privileges prior to hearing based upon an unsworn report, adequate safeguards against an erroneous deprivation of privileges existed in the procedures citing Mackey:
…false statements on the report could expose the officer to civil liability for false arrest…the predicates for a license suspension under the statute are facts with the personal knowledge of, or readily ascertainable by the officer, whom (is) an impartial government official…the officer, by reason of his training and experience, is well suited for the role which the statute affords….
The court does not appear, however, to consider the possible suspension of individuals based upon unsworn reports who do not request a hearing and appears to theorize that all such suspensions will only be temporary. Would the court hold that such individuals waive their constitutional right to due process by assumption of the risk of erroneous deprivation as a result of their failure to request a hearing?
For the moment, this decision is limited to the sworn report that is defective “merely” because the officer failed to properly swear to same. As asked earlier, the question now is whether its reasoning and holding will be extended to those sworn reports that are substantively defective or insufficient.
In mid-1986, the Secretary of State apparently realizing that the design of the original report form was defective, prepared and distributed a new supplemental form with language citing section 1-109 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. Sworn report forms using this new language are now in wide use across the state. The sworn report now provides:
Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in the “Warning to Motorist” and “Law Enforcement Sworn Report”, attached hereto and made a part hereof, are true and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily believes the same to be true.
In People v. Morrison, the defendant challenged this revised language alleging that it still constituted an unsworn statement. The court rejected this argument noting that section 2-118.1(b) provides that the hearing is civil in nature. Therefore, the content and form of the suspension reports are subject to the rules and practice of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court held that the use of verification by certification as provided in section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure satisfies the requirement of the law that the report be sworn.
The court went on to hold that when a report is properly sworn to by being filed under penalties of perjury, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of driving privileges is insubstantial. The second appellate district in People v. Angelino has indicated its accord on this issue.
C. The summary suspension hearing
Upon receipt of the notice of suspension, the person may request a hearing in the circuit court stating the grounds upon which the suspension is challenged. The hearing is held within 30 days after filing of the request or on the first appearance date scheduled.
In re Trainor, the third appellate district held that the hearing must be held within 30 days of the date of request for hearing unless a delay is occasioned by the defendant. Failure to conduct the hearing within this time requires that the suspension be rescinded. The court held that by requiring that the hearing be held within 30 days of the date of request, the legislature had expressed its determination of what constitutes a prompt hearing for due process requirements. Failure to hold the hearing within the required 30 days violates the driver’s due process rights.”
The failure to request a hearing in a timely manner or the hearing process itself shall not delay the effective date of the suspension. This, as stated before, was one of the major changes from the previous implied consent law.
However, the Trainor court held that the no-stay provision of the law is inapplicable to the inherent right of the courts to grant a stay of the suspension pending appeal of a decision sustaining a statutory summary suspension pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 305.
Illinois law provides that, while the hearing may be conducted solely upon a review of the law enforcement officers “own official reports’, the person may subpoena the officer. Under the statute, the failure of the officer to respond to a subpoena “shall be considered by the court to be the same as the failure of a complaining witness to appear in any criminal proceeding. The issue of whether or not the state is still entitled to use the law enforcement officer’s written reports under such circumstances has not been addressed by any court as of this date.
The hearing is limited to three specific issues: whether the driver was placed under arrest for the offense of DUI (under the state statute or local ordinance); whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver had committed the offense of DUI; and whether the driver was advised either (i) that driving privileges would be suspended if he or she refused to submit to testing and the driver unlawfully refused to submit to such testing or (ii) the driver was advised that driving privileges would be suspended if he or she submitted to testing which disclosed a B.A.C. of .10 or more and such testing did disclose a B.A.C. of .10 or more.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Badoud, et. Al., held:
“...we do not believe that the General Assembly intended to preclude at the hearing inquiry into whether the report was properly sworn…. In this expedited proceeding the sworn report also serves a function analogous to a complaint in an ordinary civil proceeding…we conclude that the circuit court could properly consider whether the report was sworn to in accordance with the statute….”
The constitutionality of a summary suspension statute is dependent, in part, upon the availability of a prompt post-deprivation hearing that meets the requirements set forth in Mackey. Swiftness and certainty were the goals of the legislature when the concept of summary suspension was adopted. If persons are required to litigate non-substantive issues administratively before the Secretary of State and, if necessary, in the circuit court pursuant to the Administrative Review Act, prompt post-deprivation hearings and decisions will be impossible to obtain. The procedure will become time-consuming, laborious, and, as a result, violative of legislative intent and unconstitutional.
D. Burden of proof
Other than the issue of what constitutes a proper sworn statement and whether the statement may be subsequently amended and/or resworn, the issue controlling the greatest amount of attention and dispute has been whether the burden of proof at the summary suspension hearing rests with the state or the defendant. A bill to define the burden and place it with the state stalled in the Illinois Senate after being passed by the Illinois House in the spring, 1987 session of the legislature.
The current law, like the prior implied consent law, is silent on these issues. Until the effective date of the new law, the controlling case on this issue, Village of Park Forest v. Angel, placed the burden of proof upon the state. In doing so, the court reasoned:
The legislature has provided that an implied consent hearing is to proceed in the circuit court as in other civil proceedings. Since it is a proceeding in which plaintiff seeks suspension of the driving privileges of the defendant, we hold that the plaintiff has the burden of proof to resolve all of the issues prescribed by the preponderance of the evidence to warrant the requested suspension.
In People v. Blyth, the fourth appellate district held that the burden of proof at the hearing rests with the defendant. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that the Angel decision should control, the court drew a distinction between the prior implied consent law under which Angel was decided and the current statute. In doing so, the court noted that if the defendant under the prior law had requested a hearing in a timely fashion, the suspension did not become effective until after the hearing had been concluded. After reviewing the summary procedures provided by the current statute, the court stated:
When the requirements of section 11-501 have been complied with, the suspension will be effective. The defendant then has an opportunity, if he so desires, to request a hearing pursuant to section 2-118.1. The law enforcement officer’s sworn report being on file in the circuit court and the suspension having been made effective, the filing of a petition to rescind by the defendant requires him to proceed and have the burden of proof with respect to asking the court to rescind the summary suspension.
This is particularly significant in light of the fact that, in placing the burden upon the state, the court in Angel stated:
The statute does not provide for automatic suspension of driving privileges solely upon the request and refusal to submit to a breath analysis. Instead, it provides a procedure whereby a licensee may secure a hearing prior to license suspension to satisfy basic due process requirements mandated in Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90.
Should the fact that the current statute provides for an automatic suspension 46 days after the date of arrest result in a shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant and a departure from the reasoning of the Angel court even where the defendant has requested a hearing prior to the effective date of the suspension and the court has not yet made a determination of whether the suspension should be sustained?
A close reading of the Blythe decision does not provide an answer to this question. The court appears to rely upon the fact that the suspension is summarily effective in concluding that legislature intended that the burden be on the defendant. However, the court did not discuss whether its decision would have been different if the petition to rescind had been filed prior to the actual effective date of suspension. In other words, the court fails to distinguish between the date the suspension is entered on the person’s record by the Secretary of State and the date it actually becomes effective which may be a difference of up to 46 days.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that in Blythe, the petition to rescind the summary suspension was not filed with the trial court until 12 days after that suspension had already gone into effect. Also, the hearing on the petition to rescind was not held until over two months after its filing. Again, the question arises as to whether the court’s decision on this issue would have been different had the suspension not already been in effect at the time of the filing of the petition to rescind. If the petition had been filed prior to the effective date of the suspension, would the reasoning of Angel still have been rejected?
Just 20 days after Blythe, and citing Blythe as authority, the second district appellate court held in People v. Griffith that the burden of proof rests with the defendant. Although, in that case, the petition to rescind was filed prior to the effective date of the suspension, the court did not address that fact and stated:
In the instant case, the defendant has raised no argument which would undermine the analysis of the Blythe court. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s allocation of the burden of proof was proper.
The court also cited Sutton v. Edgar as additional authority for its position. In the author’s opinion, the use of such authority by the court is misplaced. The court in Sutton was considering a plaintiff’s appeal of the Secretary of State’s denial of a petition for reinstatement of driving privileges made pursuant to section 2-118. The court held that the burden of proof rested with the plaintiff seeking reinstatement. However, in that case the plaintiff had made no challenge to the order of suspension/revocation which had caused the original loss of his license several years before and was simply seeking to obtain the restoration of limited privileges.
In People v. Orth the first decision addressing this issue under the new law, the third appellate district was widely thought to have held that once the petition to rescind is filed by the defendant, the burden of proof shifts to the state. However, in People v. Brandt, that same court has more recently stated:
In People v. Orth we did not reach the issue of whether the trial court had correctly ruled that the burden of proof shifted to the State once the defendant filed a proper petition to rescind. Rather, the parties argued, and we considered only the foundational requirements for the State’s introduction into evidence of breath analysis results. We held that “Once the results of (a breath test) are utilized in a proceeding * * * the rules governing admissibility of such test results must govern…. Based on our examination, we concur with the Second and Fourth Districts that after the defendant files a petition to rescind, he bears the initial burden of setting forth a prima facie case establishing in his favor one or more of the section 2-118.1(b) bases for rescinding a summary suspension….
Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the court must notify the Secretary of State of its decision to sustain or rescind the suspension. The court’s decision to sustain or rescind is confidential.
Any suspension which has been sustained after hearing, or which was not challenged, must remain in effect for the minimum periods provided in 6-208.1. Furthermore, full privileges are not restored until the required reinstatement fee has been paid to the circuit court and forwarded to the Secretary of State.
If the driver is subsequently convicted of DUI and driving privileges are revoked pursuant to section 6-205, any period already served for the summary suspension will be credited to the minimum period of revocation imposed under section 6-208.
The concept of summary suspension has been based upon the belief that only swift and certain loss of license can effectively deter the drinking driver.
Illinois has now embraced the concept of summary suspension for over two years and, in the author’s opinion, an answer to the claims of those advocating the concept is not yet in. Furthermore, a final answer will not be in until the courts have substantially completed the process of reviewing the law and the legislature has completed revising the law in response to opinions handed down by the courts and as empirical experience with the law dictates.
In the meantime, attorneys, the courts and the legislature must continue to address and seek a fair and appropriate balance between the interest of the public in safe highways, free of the alcohol/drug impaired driver, and the constitutional rights of the individual driver charged with driving under the influence.